A Cooperative Solution to
Two-Player Strategic Games
consider finite two-player strategic games with sidepayments.
We assign a "strategically cooperative value" to each player.
This value generalizes the notion of value from zero-sum games
to general-sum games. Our solution decomposes any game into the
sum of a cooperative game and a competitive game. The
cooperative component is a team game, i.e., a game of common
payoffs. The competitive game is a zero-sum game. We give
simple axioms which are uniquely satisfied by the proposed
This is joint work
with Ehud Kalai.
Tauman Kalai did his graduate work at Carnegie Mellon University
under the supervision of Avrim Blum. He then was a postdoc at
MIT where his research interests included machine learning
theory, randomized algorithms, and game theory. Prior to joining
the College of Computing at Georgia Tech, Kalai was an assistant
professor at the Toyota Technological Institute in Chicago.