Abstract: We introduce a class of auction and exchange
mechanisms the "assignment exchanges" which are tight
simplifications of direct Walrasian exchange mechanisms. The
class is distinguished by the message space it uses to
parameterize preference reports. In its "basic" version, the
assignment exchange respects integer constraints, generalizing
the Shapley-Shubik mechanism for indivisible goods. Connections
are reported between the assignment exchanges, ascending
multi-product clock auctions, uniform price auctions for a
single product, and Vickrey auctions. The exchange mechanisms
accommodate buying, selling and swapping goods that are
substitutes, as well as some classes of complementary goods.
is the Shirley and Leonard Ely professor of Humanities and
Sciences in the
Department of Economics at Stanford
University and professor, by
courtesy, at the
Stanford Graduate School of Business.
He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences, a fellow of
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a winner of the
Nemmers Prize in Economics.
Milgrom has made
well-known contributions to many areas of economics, including
auctions, incentive theory, industrial economics, economic
history, economics of manufacturing, economics of organizations,
and game theory. His book with John Roberts, Economics,
Organization and Management, opened a new area to economic
Milgrom is best known, however, for his
contributions to the theory of auctions and for pioneering
contributions to the practical design of multi-item auctions.
Putting Auction Theory to Work
was published by Cambridge University Press and received
enthusiastic reviews from both
Nobel-winning economists and leading practitioners.