Assignment Exchanges

Abstract: We introduce a class of auction and exchange mechanisms ­ the "assignment exchanges" ­ which are tight simplifications of direct Walrasian exchange mechanisms. The class is distinguished by the message space it uses to parameterize preference reports. In its "basic" version, the assignment exchange respects integer constraints, generalizing the Shapley-Shubik mechanism for indivisible goods. Connections are reported between the assignment exchanges, ascending multi-product clock auctions, uniform price auctions for a single product, and Vickrey auctions. The exchange mechanisms accommodate buying, selling and swapping goods that are substitutes, as well as some classes of complementary goods.


Biography:  Paul Milgrom (paul@milgrom.net) is the Shirley and Leonard Ely professor of Humanities and Sciences in the Department of Economics at Stanford University and professor, by courtesy, at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences, a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a winner of the Nemmers Prize in Economics.

Milgrom has made well-known contributions to many areas of economics, including auctions, incentive theory, industrial economics, economic history, economics of manufacturing, economics of organizations, and game theory. His book with John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management, opened a new area to economic research.

Milgrom is best known, however, for his contributions to the theory of auctions and for pioneering contributions to the practical design of multi-item auctions. Milgrom’s book Putting Auction Theory to Work was published by Cambridge University Press and received enthusiastic reviews from both Nobel-winning economists and leading practitioners.


Paul Milgrom