Resilient Mechanism Design
Mechanism design is not very robust. It is traditionally
vulnerable to the problems of equilibrium selection,
collusion, and irrationality of some of the players.
We thus put forward notions, techniques, and conceptual
frameworks for a new approach, resilient mechanism design,
and prove basic results about the existence and power of
resilient mechanisms in various settings. In particular, we
construct resilient mechanisms for guaranteeing revenue and/or
efficiency in TRULY COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS.
(Based on works with
Paul Valiant, and work with Jing Chen).
Silvio Micali received his Laurea in Mathematics from the
University of Rome in 1978, and his Ph.D. in Computer Science
form the University of California at Berkeley in 1983. He joined
MIT's faculty in 1983, where is the co-founder and co-leader of
the Information and Computer Security Group.
Silvio’s long-time research interests are cryptography, zero
knowledge, pseudo-random generation, and secure protocols. His
latest scientific interest is cryptographic game theory.
Silvio is the recipient of the Goedel Prize (in theoretical
computer science) and the RSA prize (in Cryptography). He is a
member of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy
of Engineering, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.