Resilient Mechanism Design

Abstract: Mechanism design is not very robust. It is traditionally vulnerable to the problems of equilibrium selection, collusion, and irrationality of some of the players.

We thus put forward notions, techniques, and conceptual frameworks for a new approach, resilient mechanism design, and prove basic results about the existence and power of resilient mechanisms in various settings. In particular, we construct resilient mechanisms for guaranteeing revenue and/or efficiency in TRULY COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS.

(Based on works with Paul Valiant, and work with Jing Chen).


Biography: Silvio Micali received his Laurea in Mathematics from the University of Rome in 1978, and his Ph.D. in Computer Science form the University of California at Berkeley in 1983. He joined MIT's faculty in 1983, where is the co-founder and co-leader of the Information and Computer Security Group.

Silvio’s long-time research interests are cryptography, zero knowledge, pseudo-random generation, and secure protocols. His latest scientific interest is cryptographic game theory.

Silvio is the recipient of the Goedel Prize (in theoretical computer science) and the RSA prize (in Cryptography). He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.



Silvio Micali