Network Security Games
Abstract: Security is
a major concern for the Internet. Users and providers
make investments to protect the network from security attacks.
We explore two types of strategic behavior.
Security investments have a positive externality and,
consequently, one may expect some level of free-riding. We
develop a model of such free-riding and provide bounds for the
resulting price of anarchy.
Another aspect of strategic behavior in network security is the
interaction between attackers and defenders. It is typical to
explore how one can protect the network from attacks. In our
presentation we consider also how attackers anticipate the best
response of the defenders. We explore two models of such a game.
The first model considers the design of viruses. The idea is
that if a virus is too aggressive, it is easier to detect.
Accordingly, there is a optimum level of aggressiveness for
viruses to be most effective. The second model studies intruders
that may corrupt data in sensor networks. We explore
the strategy of network users when intruders may be present.
He received his
Ph.D. in EECS from UC Berkeley. He is the author of An
Introduction to Queueing Networks (Prentice Hall, 1988) and of
Communication Networks: A First Course (2nd ed.
McGraw-Hill,1998) and co-author of High-Performance
Communication Networks (2nd ed, Morgan Kaufman, 2000). Prof.
Walrand is a Fellow of the Belgian American Education Foundation
and of the IEEE and a recipient of the Lanchester Prize and of
the Stephen O. Rice Prize.