Network Security Games

Abstract: Security is a major concern for the Internet. Users and providers make investments to protect the network from security attacks. We explore two types of strategic behavior.
Security investments have a positive externality and, consequently, one may expect some level of free-riding. We develop a model of such free-riding and provide bounds for the resulting price of anarchy.
Another aspect of strategic behavior in network security is the  interaction between attackers and defenders. It is typical to explore how one can protect the network from attacks. In our presentation we consider also how attackers anticipate the best response of the defenders. We explore two models of such a game.
The first model considers the design of viruses. The idea is that if a  virus is too aggressive, it is easier to detect. Accordingly, there is a optimum level of aggressiveness for viruses to be most effective. The second model studies intruders that may corrupt data in sensor networks. We explore the strategy of network users when intruders may be present.

Biography: He received his Ph.D. in EECS from UC Berkeley. He is the author of An Introduction to Queueing Networks (Prentice Hall, 1988) and of Communication Networks: A First Course (2nd ed. McGraw-Hill,1998) and co-author of High-Performance Communication Networks (2nd ed, Morgan Kaufman, 2000). Prof. Walrand is a Fellow of the Belgian American Education Foundation and of the IEEE and a recipient of the Lanchester Prize and of the Stephen O. Rice Prize.


Jean Walrand