Altruistic Kidney Exchange

Abstract: The recent literature on kidney exchange mostly considers exchange between incompatible donor-patient pairs where a donor cannot medically donate a kidney to her own patient even she can donate to the patient of the other pair. It has been shown that major efficiency gains are obtained if compatible pairs can be included in exchange. We consider a model with both incompatible and compatible pairs, and extend some of the results in the literature. One practically important extension is that the number of patients who receive a transplant is the same at each Pareto efficient matching. We also extend the well-known Gallai -Edmonds Decomposition Lemma to present model.

This is joint work with Utku Unver.


Biography: Tayfun Sonmez  is a Professor of Economics at Boston College.  His research and teaching interests are in game theory and mechanism/market design. He is one of the pioneers of the mechanism design resarch on school choice which recently influenced  the choice of matching mechanisms including in New York City and in Boston. He is one of the founders and designers of the New England Program for Kidney Exchange, for incompatible patient-donor pairs. He is a Fellow of the Econometric Society. He received his Ph.D. at Rochester  University in 1995.





Tayfun Sonmez