Altruistic Kidney Exchange
The recent literature on kidney exchange mostly considers
exchange between incompatible donor-patient pairs where a donor
cannot medically donate a kidney to her own patient even she can
donate to the patient of the other pair. It has been shown that
major efficiency gains are obtained if compatible pairs can be
included in exchange. We consider a model with both incompatible
and compatible pairs, and extend some of the results in the
literature. One practically important extension is that the
number of patients who receive a transplant is the same at each
Pareto efficient matching. We also extend the well-known Gallai
-Edmonds Decomposition Lemma to present model.
This is joint work with Utku Unver.
Tayfun Sonmez is a Professor of
Economics at Boston College. His research and teaching
interests are in game theory and mechanism/market design. He is
one of the pioneers of the mechanism design resarch on school
choice which recently influenced the choice of matching
mechanisms including in New York City and in Boston. He is one
of the founders and designers of the New England Program for
Kidney Exchange, for incompatible patient-donor pairs. He is a
Fellow of the Econometric Society. He received his Ph.D. at
Rochester University in 1995.