**
Learning by Trial
and Error**
**Abstract: **A
person learns by trial and error if he occasionally tries out
new strategies,
rejecting choices that are erroneous in the sense that they do
not lead to higher payoffs. In a game, however, strategies can
become erroneous due to a change of behavior by someone else. We
introduce a learning rule in which behavior is conditional on
whether a player experiences an error of the first or second
type. This rule, called interactive trial and error learning,
implements Nash equilibrium behavior in any game with generic
payoffs and at least one pure Nash equilibrium.
**
Paper****: **
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**Biography: **
Peyton Young is a pioneer in evolutionary
game theory and its application to the study of institutional
and technological change. He has also made major contributions
to the theory of learning in games. His most recent books on
these subjects are: Strategic Learning and its Limits (Arne Ryde
Memorial Lectures, Oxford University Press, 2004), and
Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory
of Institutions (Princeton University Press, 1998). Other books
include Fair Allocation (American Mathematical Society, 1985,
ed.), Cost Allocation: Methods, Principles, Applications
(North-Holland, 1985, ed.), Negotiation Analysis (University of
Michigan Press, 1991, ed.), Equity in Theory and Practice
(Princeton University Press, 1994), Social Dynamics (MIT Press,
2001, ed. with Steven Durlauf), and Fair Representation (2nd
ed., The Brookings Institution, 2001, with M.L. Balinski).
He is President of the Game Theory
Society, a Fellow of the British Academy, and a Fellow of the
Econometric Society. |